


The background features a close-up of a person's face wearing safety glasses, with a grid-like digital overlay. The image is partially obscured by a dark, rounded rectangular shape on the right side.

INTEGRITY OF DOCKER IMAGES

Signatures, Verification and a Tool for k8s



Bachelor in computer science @ **FU Berlin**



Master in computer science @ **FU Berlin**



Master thesis about the **Meltdown** attack



IT Security Engineer @ **SSE**

Philipp Belitz

- ✓ Cycling enthusiast
- ✓ Magic the Gathering player

Who am I?

MOTIVATION - SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS

Shadowhammer¹



NotPetya²

3 Years After NotPetya, Many Organizations Still in Danger of Similar Attacks

The same gaps that enabled ransomware to spread remain in patching, network segmentation, backup practices, security experts say.

Three years after the NotPetya ransomware outbreak overwhelmed numerous businesses in Ukraine and more than 60 other countries, many enterprises remain as vulnerable as ever to similar attacks.

¹ Quelle: <https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/asus-supply-chain-attack-highlights-new-security-vulnerability-for-tech-giants>

² Quelle: <https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/3-years-after-notpetya-many-organizations-still-in-danger-of-similar-attacks/d/d-id/1338200>


SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS – AN EXAMPLE




SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS – AN EXAMPLE




SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS – AN EXAMPLE



SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS – AN EXAMPLE




CONTAINERS – BASICS




How to differentiate container images?

- Container images can be identified by their **name** → `docker.io/nginx:1.18`
- **Tag:** a mutable, human-readable description → `.../nginx:1.18.0`
- **Digest:** an immutable, unique SHA256 hash of the container's content → `.../nginx@sha256:69d4...5c00`
- Images always have a digest, but not necessarily a tag


OBJECTIVE




OBJECTIVE



OBJECTIVE



OBJECTIVE



NOTARY AND TUF

Where to store the signatures?


The logo for Notary, featuring the word "notary" in a stylized, lowercase, white font on a dark blue background.

- A Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) Project
- Works as server that stores signature information
- Implements *The Update Framework*

*The Update Framework*

- General Framework for securing software update systems
- Also CNCF
- Has several design goals:
 - Easy to integrate
 - Key compromise resilience
 - Freshness

NOTARY AND TUF – STRUCTURE




signatures


Legend

- private key
- image tag
- image digest

NOTARY AND TUF – STRUCTURE



NOTARY AND TUF – STRUCTURE




- ✓ signatures
- ✓ key compromise resilience
- ✓ rollback protection

Legend

- public key
- private key
- H() hash function
- version tag
- image tag
- image digest

NOTARY AND TUF – STRUCTURE





- ✓ signatures
- ✓ key compromise resilience
- ✓ rollback protection
- ✓ freeze protection

Legend

- public key
- private key
- H()
- version tag
- expiry date
- image tag
- image digest

OBJECTIVE



OBJECTIVE



DOCKER CONTENT TRUST (DCT)


- Automatic signing and verification on push and pull by setting:
 - `DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1`
 - `DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST_SERVER=...`
- Extends docker client with `docker trust` subcommands
- Simple key and signature management

DOCKER CONTENT TRUST IN KUBERNETES

Kubernetes does not support Docker Content Trust!

How to integrate it into Kubernetes nevertheless

- Use Kubernetes Admission Controllers
- They intercept requests sent to Kubernetes + apply user-defined controls on them
- Two types: validating and mutating Admission Controller
- Use this for doing image signature verification



CONNAISSEUR



Signature Verification



Trust Pinning (public root key)

CONNAISSEUR


- 1 Extract image reference from request


- 2 Call notary API for trust data

- 3 Validate trust data
 - Deny request if no or invalid trust data
 - Proceed

- 4 Apply policy
 - Deny request if trust data doesn't comply to policy
 - Extract "signed" digest

- 5 Modify request with digest



A photograph of two young children, a boy and a girl, sitting at a desk with a laptop. Both children have their mouths wide open in excitement and their arms raised. The boy is on the left, wearing a dark blue t-shirt with 'YAMAHA' printed on it. The girl is on the right, wearing a green and white striped t-shirt. A white speech bubble with a black border and a tail pointing to the boy contains the word 'DEMO' in bold, black, uppercase letters. The background shows an office environment with a green wall and a red exit sign.

DEMO



- Admission controller for Kubernetes
 - Signature Verification
 - Trust Pinning
- Open Source
- Design principles
 - Simplicity
 - Compatibility (AKS, EKS, GKE, K3s, MicroK8s, Minikube, SysEleven Metakube, ...)
- Features
 - Allow-Listing
 - Detection Mode
 - (Alerting)
- Alternatives
 - Open Policy Agent (<https://siebert-maximilian.medium.com/ensure-content-trust-on-kubernetes-using-notary-and-open-policy-agent-485ab3a9423c>)
 - Portieris (IBM only)

OUTLOOK

- Notary v2 (<https://github.com/notaryproject/nv2>)
 - No more storing of signature in external server
 - Signature planned to be stored inside image, thus changing the OCI image specification
- Check out our GitHub Repository (<https://github.com/sse-secure-systems/connaisseur>)
- Also read our blog post for more details (<https://medium.com/sse-blog/container-image-signatures-in-kubernetes-19264ac5d8ce>)
- **Cheers**